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digital forensics institute in malaysia: the way forward
The Trojan horse defence is an important aspect  
of the investigation of crimes involving digital 
evidence. In raising this defence, the accused claims 
that they are not responsible for some or all of the 
digital evidence that forms the offence, but by someone 
else who has abused their computer system with a 
Trojan horse or other malicious code. The prosecution 
must refute such claims with certainty, otherwise 
the court (or the jury) will have to find the defendant 
innocent of the crime.
To avoid the Trojan horse defence, law enforcement 
agents will also, in addition to presenting digital evidence 
(which must not only prove the existence of a crime, but 
also the absence of malicious codes and other offenders 
who could be involved in the offence), use traditional 
forms of evidence, such as physical evidence, witnesses, 
motive, and the computer knowledge of the accused. The 
stronger the connection between digital and other forms 
of evidence, the lower the probability of using a Trojan 
horse defence as a diversion with the intent to confuse 
the court and the jury.
The article presents theoretical and practical dilemmas 
of a Trojan horse defence, offering some solutions for law 
enforcement agents when dealing with such a defence 
within the context of Slovenian criminal law.
Introduction 
Using the Trojan horse defence, the defendant admits that 
the crime was committed through his computer system, 
but denies that he was the perpetrator of the offence. 
He asserts that somebody else must have committed 
the crime using malicious software, or placed it in his 
computer system. The prosecutor must prove that the 
crime was not committed by malicious software or some 
other perpetrator using this software, which can be 
difficult. The purpose of this defence is often to create 
doubt in the minds of the jury and the judge. The defence 
will be hard to refute and will often suffice for an acquittal 
on the basis of reasonable doubt.
At first glance it is obvious that this is an extremely 
difficult issue that requires the cooperation of various 
experts – criminal lawyers that know the legal system, but 
are restricted in terms of technical know-how; and digital 
evidence specialists, who have technical and expert 
knowledge, but often lack knowledge of the legal system. 
The development of technology has brought us thus far, 
as a participant at the conference entitled Current Issues 
in IT Security in Freiburg 2009 noted: ‘At a conference 
on IT security in one of the largest criminal justice and 
criminological research institutes in the world, none of 
the participants dares to argue that he is an “IT security 
expert”!’1 
It is necessary to adopt a multidisciplinary approach 
when dealing with a Trojan horse defence. Such 
an approach will include classical methods of law 
enforcement (interrogation, observation, searching 
for motive, testimony and other physical evidence), as 
well as new forms of digital evidence (the existence of a 
Trojan horse on the defendant’s system, the possibility 
of infection of the information system, the probability 
that another person committed the offence through a 
artIcle:
the trojan 
horse defence 
– a modern 
problem 
of digital 
evidence By Miha Šepec
1 Aleš Završnik, ‘Report on the conference 
“Current Issues in IT Security”, Freiburg 
2009’, Journal of Criminalistics and 
Criminology Studies, Volume 60, issue 
2, 2009, 181-184, at 181; web site of the 
journal: http://www.mnz.gov.si/si/medijsko_
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malicious code).
This article presents the characteristics of the Trojan 
horse defence, problems of proof and how this defence 
tactic can be avoided in practice.
The definition of a Trojan horse defence
It should be noted that the term ‘Trojan horse defence’ is 
not an established legal term, but comes from a number 
of digital evidence specialists that wrote texts on the topic 
some time ago. The Trojan horse defence is the classic 
defence of passing the blame on a third person – ‘The 
Wrong Person Defence’ or ‘SODDI defence’ (some other 
dude did it).
In this defence, the defendant must offer at least some 
evidence that there is a possibility that a third party was 
liable for the commission of the criminal act. However, 
as Griffin writes, in many states of America this can be 
prohibited unless the defence establishes a direct and 
convincing connection with a third party and the crime 
that has been committed. Such evidence may be excluded 
if the only objective is to mislead the jury.2 
The defendant invariably cannot establish a connection 
with the third party when claiming a Trojan horse defence. 
It is only possible to establish the probability of a third 
party using malicious codes (as Trojan horses) through 
his computer system: ‘Ironically the anonymity of the 
threat, which is usually fatal to the assertion of a SODDI 
defence in a prosecution for real-world crimes, works to 
the defense’s advantage.’3 
There are no special rules of evidence in Slovenian law.4 
The defendant can argue any kind of defence he wishes, 
without limitation. In the Slovenian criminal system, 
the burden of proof is always on the prosecution. The 
prosecution must prove that the crime was not committed 
by a third party manipulating the defendant’s computer 
system through malicious code. A variety of malicious 
codes in a computer system may be responsible for a 
legitimate Trojan horse defence. The most common forms 
of malicious code are Trojan horses and bots. These are 
discussed in brief below.
Trojan horses
Trojan horses, as the name suggests, are seemingly 
innocent programs that contain hidden features (for 
example, by allowing the hacker to obtain access to the 
computer system). They act like viruses, thus requiring 
some preliminary activity by the recipient in the form of 
execution of files or by visiting a web site, which contains 
a Trojan horse.5  Trojan horses belong to a group of 
programs commonly called ‘malware’ by the technical 
community, which are defined as a set of instructions 
to execute a process in a foreign computer system as 
instructed by the attacker. These programs are often 
unwanted, harmful and hidden.6 
The success of the Trojan horse will partly depend 
on the level of protection in the computer system. The 
characteristic of a Trojan horse is that the software often 
has an apparently innocent function, such as showing the 
time and weather on the desktop, but in the background 
the program has a secondary function – this is called the 
‘Back Door’. This allows the writer of the Trojan horse 
software to execute certain functions, such as to gain 
access to the computer system, to obtain files from this 
system, or install other malware on the system.7 
A Trojan horse generally does not spread and does 
not degrade the performance of the computer system 
into which it is placed. In their simplest form, a Trojan 
horse requires a degree of naïveté from the user, who 
executes an unknown file. However, modern and more 
sophisticated forms of Trojan horses are becoming more 
difficult to identify and locate, as Bilar notes: ‘anti-virus 
software does not prevent all forms of malicious software 
from penetrating computers and networks – some 
malicious software will not be identified by anti-virus 
software’.8 
The efficiency of the Trojan horse is evident by the fact 
that Germany is using them for on-line investigations 
(die Online-Durchsuchung), which is a form of covert 
telecommunication surveillance (Die Quelle-Telekom
munikationsüberwachung).9 The use of Trojan horse 
software programs, called ‘der Bundestrojaner’, and other 
programs for this purpose was limited by the German 
2 Lissa Griffin. ‘Avoiding Wrongful 
Convictions: Re-examining the “Wrong-
Person” Defense’ 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 129 
(2009).
3 Susan W. Brenner and Brian Carrier, with 
Jef Henninger, ‘The trojan horse defense in 
cybercrime cases’, 21 Santa Clara Computer 
& High Tech. L.J. 1 (2004), p 17.
4 Ana Burgar and Klara Miletič, ‘Slovenia’ 
in Stephen Mason, gen. ed., International 
Electronic Evidence (British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, 2008).
5 Jonathan Clough, Principles of cybercrime, 
(2010, Cambridge University Press).
6 Samuel C. McQuade III, ed, Encyclopedia of 
Cybercrime (2008, Greenwood Publishing).
7 Neil Barrett, Digital Crime: Policing the 
Cybernation (1997, Kogan Page).
8 Daniel Bilar, ‘Known knowns, known 
unknowns and unknown unknowns: anti-
virus issues, malicious software and internet 
attacks for non-technical audiences’, Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review, 6 (2009), 123-131, at 124.
9 Holger Hesterberg, Das neue 
“Computergrundrecht” und die 
“Bundestrojaner”, Anwalt.de, 17.10.2011, 
available at http://www.anwalt.de/
rechtstipps/das-neue-computergrundrecht-
und-die-bundestrojaner_021554.html.
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Constitutional Court decisions 1 BvR 370/07 and 1 BvR 
595/07 on 27 February 2007.10
Bots 
A bot is a program that infects a computer system and 
enables a third party to control the infected computer or 
computer system. An attacker can exploit a security flaw 
of a computer connected to the internet, and install on it a 
large number of small programs (called Demons). Infected 
computers are called zombies, and can be controlled 
remotely.11  One of the features of a bot is that the 
software does not directly interfere with the system on 
which it is running – the user is not usually aware that his 
system is infected.12  Only when the operator activates the 
bots, can the functions of the system be compromised. 
When the attack ends, or the third party deactivates 
the bots, the infected system runs smoothly again. The 
efficiency of bots depend on the level of protection in the 
computer system. For instance, firewalls are a typical form 
of defense against bots and other malicious code.
The Trojan horse defence in general
The first known instance of the Trojan horse defence in 
England and Wales was the case of Charles Schofield. 
Schofield was cleared of charges of possessing abusive 
images of children.13 Julian Green was charged with 
possession of abusive images of children, and also 
argued the Trojan horse defence. After examining his 
computer, the forensic team found many malicious codes 
(including Trojan horses). Green argued that these codes 
were responsible for the images. The digital evidence 
specialists for the prosecution were not able to refute his 
claims.14 
The first example of the Trojan horse defence that was 
successful and received a great deal of publicity occurred 
in October 2003 in England and Wales. The members of 
the jury acquitted Aaron Caffrey. Caffrey was accused of 
a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the port 
of Houston. The attack had caused enormous damage, 
because port network connections were not available, 
and therefore not able to provide information to ships 
masters, mooring companies and support companies 
responsible for the support of ships sailing and leaving 
the port.15 
The attack was executed through Caffrey’s computer 
system. A forensics team found the programs used for 
the attack, but no traces of a Trojan horse. The defence 
argued that Caffrey was a member of a hacker group, but 
that he did not execute the attack. Instead, members of 
his team must have breached his system and executed 
a DDoS attack on the port through his computer. The 
defence also argued that it must have been a special 
type of a Trojan horse, which erased all traces after it 
was used, so that it could not be detected in his system.16  
Professor Neil Barrett explained to the court that it was 
impossible for anyone to have edited the recorded log 
files on Caffrey’s computer,17  and that if a Trojan horse 
really was the source of the attack, than at least some 
traces should have been found. This explanation failed 
to convince the jury. Kotadia18  wondered if the decision 
would have been the same if the members of the jury had 
consisted of technology experts, or at least computer-
conscious people.
An important difference between the Schofield and 
Green cases and the Caffrey case, is that the forensic 
team in the first two cases found traces of Trojans and 
other malware in the computer system which could have 
been responsible for the claims made by the defendants. 
However, in the Caffrey case, there were no traces of any 
malware.
An analysis of the Trojan horse defence
Consider the analogy with murder. Invariably, a forensics 
team will probably find traces of DNA of the defendant 
and other people, any of whom could have committed the 
murder. If there is no other compelling evidence against 
the accused, their innocence must be presumed as long 
as the possibility that another unknown person was 
responsible for the act. If there is no trace of any other 
presence, besides that of the defendant, then a defence 
10 German Constitutional Court (Das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht) decisions 1 
BvR 370/07 1 and 1 BvR 595/07, available 
at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/
rs20080227_1bvr037007.html. 
11 Jonathan Clough, Principles of cybercrime.
12 Samuel C. McQuade III, ed, Encyclopedia of 
Cybercrime.
13 John Leyden, ‘Trojan defence clears man on 
child porn charges’, The Register, 24 April 
2003, available at http://www.theregister.
co.uk/2003/04/24/trojan_defence_clears_
man/.
14 ‘Man cleared over porn “may sue”’, BBC 
News, 31 July 2003, available at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/devon/3114815.stm.
15 Jelena Mirkovič and Peter L. Reiher, ‘A 
Taxonomy of DDoS Attack and DDoS 
Defense Mechanisms’, ACM SIGCOMM 
Computer Communication Review, 
Volume 34, Number 2, 2004, pp. 39-53, 
available on-line at http://www.eecis.udel.
edu/~sunshine/publications/ccr.pdf.
16 Susan W. Brenner and Brian Carrier, with 
Jef Henninger, ‘The trojan horse defense in 
cybercrime cases’; see also an on-line note 
by Susan Brenner, ‘Trojan Horse Defence 
CYB3RCRIM3, Observations on technology, 
law and lawlessness’, 17 June 2006, 
available at http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.
com/2006/06/trojan-horse-defense.html.
17 This is not correct. Root kits can do this.
18 Munir Kotadia, ‘The case of the Trojan 
Wookie’, ZDNet UK, 21 October 2003, 
available at http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/it-
strategy/2003/10/21/the-case-of-the-trojan-
wookiee-39117240/; for further references, 
see Stephen Mason, gen. ed., Electronic 
Evidence (2nd edn, LexisNexis Butterworths, 
2010), 10.199-10.200.
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that some other person must have committed the crime 
and then wiped all traces of DNA after the murder will 
often not be successful. It follows that the prosecution 
will have to provide other evidence, such as whether the 
accused was able to inflict death, and whether he had a 
motive.
Similarly in cyber crime cases, digital evidence alone 
will often not suffice. A multidisciplinary approach will 
usually be required. In addition to digital evidence, the 
prosecution will have to provide other forms of evidence 
(physical evidence, evidence of motive, witnesses). 
Traditional forms of evidence will also act to increase 
the weight of any digital evidence.19  It is important to 
be careful not to blindly believe all the digital evidence, 
since the possibility of forged digital evidence is always 
possible.20 
Daniel Bilar explains how antivirus programs work, and 
points out that a lot of malicious codes are not recognized 
by antivirus software that is not updated regularly. 
Between 26 and 31 per cent of malicious software is not 
detected on antivirus programs that are not up-dated for 
a week (this percentage is only valid for better antivirus 
programs – poor quality antivirus programs can miss 
up to 80 per cent of malicious codes). It is clear that 
it is reasonably probable, and not only a hypothetical 
exception, that a computer can be infected with a Trojan 
horse. It is important to be aware that although people 
might have a basic understanding of technology (for 
instance, the majority will not necessarily open strange 
files received by e-mail), very few are aware of the fact 
that they can download various forms of malicious code 
(such as Trojan horses) simply by launching an URL site, 
opening a PDF document or browsing internet pages. 
Up-dated antivirus software, firewalls, and caution on 
the internet help reduce the risk, but cannot completely 
eliminate it.21 
When we speak of ‘defence’ it is appropriate that we 
briefly explain what this means in criminal proceedings. 
The definition of an offence is based on an objective part 
(the act), and the subjective part (the mental element). 
When a person is charged with committing a statutory 
crime (the act) and being required to be responsible for 
the act (the mental element), he may respond by giving 
an explanation (a defence) with which he can negate 
accusations of the prosecution and prove his innocence: 
the ‘defence operates as an excuse. The culpability of the 
accused is negated and he is excused from the normal 
consequences of conviction and sentencing which would 
flow from commission of the prohibited act with the 
requisite mens rea.’22 
Modern English and American criminal law doctrine 
distinguishes between ‘justification’ and an ‘excuse’, as 
noted by Professor Ormerod: ‘An act is justified when 
society positively approves of it. It is merely excused 
when society disapproves of it but thinks it is not right to 
punish the defendant.’23  The problem of this distinction is 
that ‘there is no agreement on the precise model that the 
classifications should take.’24  In this regard, the Trojan 
horse defence not only negates the mental element, but 
also the act – the defendant’s case is not only he did not 
commit the act, he and did not even know about the crime 
being committed, as noted by Allen: ‘A plea of justification 
operates to cancel the unlawfulness of the accused’s 
conduct; there being no unlawful act, there is thus no 
crime of which to convict him.’25 
The Slovenian criminal law differs from common law. 
A defence in Slovenian criminal law may be defined 
as any act of the defendant which intends to prove his 
innocence or disprove the allegations against him by the 
prosecution. ‘Defensive tactics’ is a broader term that 
includes both the strategy of the defendant, as with the 
procedural acts that follow this strategy (defence with 
insanity; procedural acts: a proposal for an expert opinion 
– such as a psychiatrist; presenting evidence on the use of 
certain substances that could lead to insanity).
It is obvious that a Trojan horse defence will often be 
misused in offences connected with computer systems. 
Any forensic examination of a computer system that 
finds a Trojan horse or other malicious code will present 
an opportunity for the defence to plea a potential Trojan 
horse defence, and with it the doubting of all the digital 
evidence. The latter often only proves that a crime was 
committed – but not with certainty by whom. However, 
it does not follow that because Trojan horse software 
or other forms of malicious software are found on a 
computer, that such evidence is relevant to the case. It 
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19 For a more detailed anaylsis and discussion 
on this precise points, see Stephen Mason 
and Professor Burkhard Schafer, Chapter 
2, The characteristics of digital evidence, 
in Stephen Mason, gen. ed., Electronic 
Evidence.
20 Sergey Bratus, Ashlyn Lembree and Anna 
Shubiana, ‘Software on the Witness 
Stand: What Should It Take for Us to Trust 
It?’ Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
Volume 6101 (Springer, 2010), pp 396-416, 
paper available on-line at http://www.
cs.dartmouth.edu/~sergey/; see the 
examples of the forgery of digital evidence 
in Stephen Mason, gen. ed., Electronic 
Evidence.
21 Daniel Bilar, ‘Known knowns, known 
unknowns and unknown unknowns: anti-
virus issues, malicious software and internet 
attacks for non-technical audiences’.
22 Michael Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 
(11th edn, Oxford University Press), p 169.
23 David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal 
Law, (13th edn, 2011, Oxford University 
Press), p 248.
24 David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal 
Law, p. 248.2
25 Michael Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, p 
169.
62        Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 9 (2012) © Pario Communications Limited, 2012
the trojan horse defence - a modern problem of digital evidence
might be that the malicious software is responsible for 
the computer undertaking certain activities that the owner 
or user is not aware, but it is possible that some or all of 
the items of malicious software found might not have any 
effect on the nature of the offence, because the software 
found does not undertake the activities that the defence 
claim, as in the case of the US case of State of Connecticut 
v Julie Amero.26 
An extensive Australian study on cyber crime 
reported27  that the number of detected attacks by 
Trojans is stagnating or even increasing. In 2006, of those 
organizations questioned, 21 per cent detected infection 
with Trojans, while 45 per cent detected infection with 
worms or worm infection (reports were prepared for 
each year between 2003 and 2006, which allows for 
comparisons to be made). On page 22, the authors 
remind us that:
Testing of malware developed for the purposes of 
stealing personal information and account credentials 
has revealed that, on average, 60% are not detectable 
by anti-virus software at the time they are discovered 
in the wild. Therefore, client computers with the 
most “up to date” anti-virus software signatures are 
likely to be vulnerable to such attacks about 60% of 
the time. The relatively high level of trojan infections 
reported in this survey is, therefore, likely to be a 
function of this weakness. Attackers work to increase 
the effectiveness of their attacks by modifying trojan 
malware to create new variants that are unlikely to 
be detected by most “up to date” anti-virus software 
upon release.
The investigation and the Trojan  
horse defence
Before discussing the matter from a prosecutor’s point 
of view, it is right to acknowledge that a Trojan horse 
defence can be a completely legitimate and justified 
defence of an innocent defendant, as Rasch noted in 
2004:
‘It is relatively easy to manufacture and plant 
electronic evidence consistent with guilt. In fact, with 
a few skills and tools, not only could you plant such 
evidence, but you could do so in such a way as to be 
virtually undetected, and so that it would be virtually 
impossible to determine that your target was not 
guilty.’28 
When law enforcement agencies are informed about a 
computer-related crime, of necessity they trace the crime 
to a specific computer system or systems. After seizing 
it, digital evidence specialists perform a systematic 
examination of the computer system. In addition, they 
should explore the possibility of a Trojan horse, bot or 
other malware that can be responsible for the offence. In 
Slovenia, according to Kragelj,29  a forensic examiner will 
ideally use a number of antivirus programs to recognize 
possible infections.30  However, if a digital evidence 
specialist only relies only on a single program for the 
purposes of a forensic analysis of the hard drive, (and 
this program does not recognize the Trojan horse in 
the system), and testifies that no Trojan horse or other 
malicious software was found, it is possible that the jury 
will deliver a guilty verdict to an innocent man, depending 
on the quality of the defence lawyer. In Slovenia, some 
investigators usually use only one antivirus program in a 
system check for malicious codes,31  which could present 
a serious problem regarding reasonable doubt that the 
program found all the possible malicious codes. It is 
always necessary to bear in mind the statement made by 
Šavnik, a Slovenian court digital evidence specialist, that 
‘Nothing in cyberspace is ever 100 per cent certain. There 
is always room for doubt.’32 
There are a number of issues that any investigation into 
a crime involving digital data that should be considered to 
ensure fairness to the accused:
1.  Educating digital evidence specialists, and requiring 
them as a matter of best practice to use several 
investigative programs and their integration.33  Thus 
Leuhr points that:
‘lawyers should always inquire about the depth 
26 For an exhaustive analysis of this case, see 
Stephen Mason, gen. ed., International 
Electronic Evidence, xxxvi-lxxv.
27 AusCert, Computer Crime and Security 
Survey (2006), available at http://www.
auscert.org.au/render.html?it=2001.
28 Mark Rasch, ‘The Giant Wooden Horse Did 
It!’ comments on Securityfocus.com, 19 
January 2004, at http://www.securityfocus.
com/columnists/208.
29 Interview with Primož Kragelj, a Forensics IT 
specialist in Slovenia, on 28 March 2012.
30 It is not proposed to set out the practical 
methodology used to seize, examine and 
retain digital data, because such issues 
are covered extensively in the technical 
forensic and legal literature, some examples 
include: Eoghan Casey, Digital Evidence 
and Computer Crime (3rd edn, Academic 
Press, 2011) and Stephen Mason, ed, 
Electronic Evidence, amongst others (both 
texts provide a large number of further 
references).
31 Interview with Primož Kragelj, a Forensics IT 
specialist in Slovenia, on 28 March 2012.
32 Janko Šavnik, Role of a Forensic Examiner 
for Computer Forensics, Digital Evidence 
Conference, (Law Faculty and Faculty of 
Criminal Justice and Security of University of 
Maribor, 2012).
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and breadth of a potential expert’s background. 
Lawyers should avoid the one-trick examiner 
who has only imaged and analyzed one type of 
computer using a single forensic tool. Rather, an 
attorney should look for a forensic examiner who 
has analyzed a number of different machines or 
systems, in a number of different settings, in a 
wide variety of legal cases.’34
The investigation of digital traces and evidence is certainly 
a modern challenge for digital evidence specialists, 
who must constantly upgrade their knowledge. Of 
necessity, a forensic examiner must adapt to the rapid 
development of information technology; use up-to-date 
technical equipment and information (which may be a 
major problem in poor countries, or if their country does 
not provide them with the appropriate hardware and 
software), and not to rely only on a single investigation 
program and outdated approach to studying computer 
systems.
2. Digital evidence is not the only evidence that must 
be considered when examining cyber crime offences 
(especially if consideration is given to the possibility of 
forged digital evidence).35
Law enforcement agencies often rely on ‘classical‘ 
evidence, such as motive, physical evidence (in the form 
of media or paper records) and testimony of potential 
witnesses. Corroborative evidence is helpful, such as 
photographs (as physical evidence) of children taken 
in front of a kindergarten or elementary school by the 
accused may serve as indirect evidence of his intentions. 
Through such evidence, the judge and the jury might 
reasonably conclude that the abusive images of children 
on the computer were really obtained and possessed 
by the accused, and that they were not planted there by 
some malicious code. A similar proof might be a testimony 
of a person who was asked by the defendant where he 
can get child pornography, as well as a testimony of a 
digital evidence specialist who was questioned by the 
defendant about how he might be able to conceal his 
identity and hide certain files in his computer – a later 
forensic examination might show that files were hidden 
in the computer in the way that was described to the 
defendant.
Evidence in non-digital form will be an important addition 
to digital evidence. Traditional evidence in combination 
with digital evidence will help the court to decide about 
the guilt of the accused. In a famous case of the botnet 
Mariposa,36  the alleged mastermind and creator of the 
bot, Dejan Janžekovič, was found in Maribor in Slovenia 
in 2011 (the case was also under the investigation by the 
FBI). The Trojan horse defence was introduced at a very 
early stage of the investigation. The criminal investigators, 
who obtained evidence that the suspect had sold copies 
of the bot kit for few hundred dollars for each copy, 
refuted it. Such ‘classical’ evidence helps to negate any 
sort of electronic or digital oriented defences.
3. The testimonies of medical and psychological experts 
on the mental state of the accused are also relevant. 
Such evidence might indicate that the suspect is 
unlikely to be the perpetrator (for example, an 
examination of the computer shows that abusive 
images of children are hidden with a very complex 
encryption method, but it is clear that the suspect is a 
computer illiterate and could not have hidden the files 
in such a manner).
4. Consideration might be given to the fact that the 
accused can plant Trojan horses on his computer 
system in order to later use this as a defence tactic. 
In such an example, the prosecution may need to 
point out the defendant’s computer knowledge and 
skill. If he is deemed to be a computer expert, the 
prosecution can argue that it is very probable that he 
planted such a malicious code and that he had the 
skills to do it. Furthermore, the prosecution can argue 
that it is extremely unlikely that the defendant (who is 
a computer expert) would infect his computer with an 
extremely primitive Trojan horse hidden in a suspicious 
file, which was received with an unknown e-mail. If the 
accused is computer illiterate, then such arguments 
might be favourable to the defence.
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33 In the case of State of Arizona v Bandy, the 
defence case was that malicious software 
was responsible for the action of uploading 
abusive images of children to the internet. At 
the request of the defence, the investigators 
looked at the hard disk three times. Each 
time, they found more incriminating material. 
For an analysis of this case, see Stephen 
Mason, gen. ed., International Electronic 
Evidence, lxxv-lxxxiii
34 Paul H. Leuhr, ‘Real Evidence, Virtual 
Crimes’ Criminal Justice, Volume 20, number 
3 (Fall 2005), 14-23, at 18.
35 Sergey Bratus, Lembree Ashlyn and Anna 
Shubiana, ‘Software on the Witness Stand: 
What Should It Take for Us to Trust It?’, 
available at http://www.cs.dartmouth.
edu/~sergey/trusting-e-evidence.pdf.
36 ‘John Layden, ‘How FBI, Police busted 
massive botnet’ The Register, 3 March 
2010, The Mariposa botnet was principally 
geared towards stealing online login 
credentials for banks, email services and the 
like from compromised Windows PCs. The 
malware infected an estimated 12.7 million 
computers in more than 190 countries’; John 
Leyden, ‘Maripose botnet suspects quizzed 
in Slovenia’ The Register, 22 July 2010; 
FBI, Slovenian and Spanish Police Arrest 
Mariposa Botnet Creator, Operators (FBI 
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However, one of the problems is how to assess the level 
of the computer expertise of the accused, because such 
specific knowledge is often not taught in universities and 
other schools, rather it is often self-taught and obtained 
through the social connections of the accused. The 
prosecutor will have to use indirect evidence, indications 
and signs, because there is no direct technical option 
of proving one’s computer knowledge without the 
cooperation of the accused. The computer system of the 
accused will have to be examined for possible leads, 
such as the kind of programs he uses; whether he uses 
programming language; examine his internet history, 
and look for any statements on internet forums and chat 
rooms (if attainable).
In the opinion of Kovačič,37  the mere possession of 
‘hacking programs’ is not enough to assess the computer 
knowledge and skills of the accused. There are legal 
hacking tools that are used for penetration testing (such 
as Backtrack programs, for instance), and on the other 
hand, intrusion can also be made through a regular web 
browser (such as SQL injection). A good indication would 
be if the accused developed some kind of a hacking tool 
or a virus, or if traces of such tools are found. As already 
pointed out, law enforcement agents should always 
combine digital evidence with traditional evidence. The 
police should therefore question the ‘social connections’ 
of the accused (his friends, on-line colleagues, persons 
he is communicating with on a ‘hacker’ oriented forum) 
and by doing so, gain some insight on his computer 
knowledge.
In the Caffrey case, the defence pleaded that a 
technologically advanced Trojan horse erased all traces 
from the defendant’s computer after it carried out the 
activities. While computer expert Neil Barrett testified 
that this is practically impossible, it is highly questionable 
whether the same could be argued in 2012.
Brenner, Carrier and Henninger write, on page 19, that 
‘police have found traces of Trojan horses in many cases 
we have seen so far.’ If the accused wanted to erase any 
trace of a Trojan horse or other malicious code, it would 
be necessary to use a specific program, a ‘wiping tool’, 
which could erase the traces of a malicious code on a 
system. However, traces of wiping tools remain on the 
system. The cleaning program cannot clean itself. Thus, 
it is practically impossible that there would be no digital 
traces of malware or at least the use of wiping tools on 
a computer system.38  However, the new format of hard 
drives called Solid-State Drives (SSD) with a TRIM39  
function enabled, can erase all the files that were deleted 
from the drive completely in three minutes. The advanced 
recovery programs that digital evidence specialists use 
cannot recover such files. Special write blockers used 
by digital evidence specialists cannot prevent complete 
erasure of the files.40  The new formats of SSD hard 
drives (with enabled TRIM function) can present a real 
problem when a Trojan horse defence is used and when 
the defence argues that the Trojan horse was deleted by 
a third person. Since SSD hard drives automatically erase 
all deleted files, forensic examiners will not be able to 
disprove the claims of the defence.
Leuhr also recommends a comprehensive forensic 
examination of the registry and startup files system, 
where the examiner can find traces of malware that is 
activated at each startup of the system.41  Brenner and 
colleagues advise a thorough examination of the network 
connections of the computer system.42  If a computer 
system was not connected to the network, then this would 
conceivably exclude the possibility of a malicious code 
37 Interview with Matej Kovačič PhD, an IT 
specialist with the Commission for the 
prevention of corruption, in Slovenia on 24 
May 2012.
38 Susan W. Brenner and Brian Carrier, with 
Jef Henninger, ‘The trojan horse defense in 
cybercrime cases’, pp 26 and 27.
39 A TRIM command enables an operating 
system to communicate with a solid state 
drive to inform it which blocks off data can 
be deleted or wiped.
40 Matej. Kovačič, Hash algorithms and 
integrity ensurance of digital evidence, 
Digital Evidence Conference, (Law Faculty 
and Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security 
of University of Maribor, 2012).
41 Paul H. Leuhr, ‘Real Evidence, Virtual 
Crimes’, 15.
42 Susan W. Brenner and Brian Carrier, with 
Jef Henninger, ‘The trojan horse defense in 
cybercrime cases’, p 47.
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or some other offender committing the crime through the 
computer system of the defendant.
If the investigator finds malicious software on the 
system, he must examine its performance and how it 
might affect the system. The investigator must also 
determine when these codes were installed on the 
system and if they ever really ran on it. If the investigator 
does not find any malicious software on the system, he 
must consider the possibility that these were wiped with 
wiping tools – he must therefore look for traces of these 
programs (this will be problematic on SSD hard drives 
with enabled TRIM function).
The investigator will also have difficulties in examining 
the computer system for malicious software in a case 
on an encrypted hard disk, where the computer is 
protected by a BIOS password, and the accused refuses 
to cooperate. There are basically two types of ‘BIOS 
protection’. One is that the BIOS password on the 
motherboard only prevents the computer from booting 
up. This protection is relatively easy to circumvent by 
disconnecting the battery from the motherboard and 
then to try and change the password with the factory set 
master password, or the hard drive can be connected 
to another computer. The second possibility is that the 
accused has prevented access to the hard drive with a 
special password in the system BIOS (this is possible 
with a special ATA command block or low-level hard disk 
encryption). The investigator can try to circumvent this 
protection by entering the factory-set master password, 
if this option exists. Lists of factory default passwords are 
found on the internet or with the manufacturer, however 
not all the manufacturers have included such passwords 
in their hardware.43 
Kovačič points out that BIOS protection is rarely used 
in practice, since it is relatively easy to circumvent. 
Instead, software encryption of the hard drive (with a 
program such as TrueCrypt) is often used. This protection 
can be broken by cryptanalysis (a theoretical possibility 
that is almost never used in practice), or by installing 
special equipment into the computer, such as a hardware 
interceptor (key logger) to record the password as it is 
typed into the computer, or the software version of these 
interceptors. The computer system has to be returned to 
the owner and then seized again when he has inputted 
the password. The final option is that the computer is 
seized in the moment the accused is using it (at that 
time the hard drive is not encrypted). However, all these 
solutions are quite impractical and can be sabotaged. For 
instance, the suspect can scan the computer and remove 
the key logger software, or he can use software that locks 
down the hard drive remotely via Bluetooth, when the 
computer is moved or when the network connection is 
interrupted.44 
The interrogation of the suspect is also of great 
importance in all crimes where digital evidence is 
present, and when there is a potential Trojan horse 
defence in play. Since cyber crime perpetrators often 
have no experience with law enforcement, a confession 
will be often easier to get, as indicated by Brenner and 
colleagues: ‘These suspects often confess readily and 
may even confess before being interrogated. This is 
especially true of child pornography collectors, most of 
whom have no prior contact with law enforcement. Their 
inexperience with the criminal justice system, coupled 
with the embarrassing nature of the crime, often prompts 
them to confess.’45
Undercover investigative measures are not to be 
underestimated. Article 150 of the Slovenian Criminal 
Procedural Act46 contains the following covert 
investigative measure: ‘Surveillance of electronic 
communications with eavesdropping and recording, 
and control and preservation of evidence in all forms of 
communication’.47  Combined with covert measures of 
surveillance, this can be a powerful help in the hands 
of the prosecution. However, the Slovenian Criminal 
Procedural Act stipulates that surveillance can only be 
undertaken when it is reasonable to expect that the police 
will not be able to detect, prevent, or prove the criminal 
offence with any other measure, or if this would present 
disproportionate difficulties.48  Law enforcement agencies 
do not use undercover investigative measures only to 
rebut a possible defence tactic. Undercover investigative 
measures are used for the purpose of identifying the 
possible perpetrator of a criminal offence or to provide 
evidence for the prosecution – and not for the purpose of 
countering a possible defence that a defendant might or 
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43 Interview with Matej Kovačič PhD, an IT 
specialist with the Commission for the 
prevention of corruption, in Slovenia on 24 
May 2012. 
44 For relevant case law on encryption in 
England & Wales and the United States of 
America, see Stephen Mason, Electronic 
Evidence.
45 Susan W. Brenner and Brian Carrier, with 
Jef Henninger, ‘The trojan horse defense in 
cybercrime cases’, p 27.
46 Slovenian Criminal Procedural Act (ZKP-
UPB4) Ur. l. RS n. 32/2007, amended by 
ZKP-I, ur. l. RS n. 68/2008, ZKP-J, ur. l. RS n. 
77/2009 and ZKP-K, ur. l. RS n. 91/2011.
47 In the Slovenian language ‘Nadzor 
elektronskih komunikacij s prisluškovanjem 
in snemanjem ter kontrola in zavarovanje 
dokazov o vseh oblikah komuniciranja, ki se 
prenašajo v elektronskem komunikacijskem 
omrežju.’
48 Ana Burgar and Klara Miletič, ‘Slovenia’ 
in Stephen Mason, gen. ed., International 
Electronic Evidence, 827-829.
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might not use in trial. Given the fact that the defendant 
will use the Trojan horse defence only when faced with 
accusations, it must be concluded that in Slovenia, 
undercover investigative measures will not be used only 
with the aim of countering a Trojan horse defence (but 
could of course be used simply to gather evidence about 
the crime and the possible perpetrator).
Concluding comments
The dilemmas presented in this article clearly show 
the complexity of malicious codes and the potential 
for a Trojan horse defence. However, digital evidence 
specialists are restricted by the government and 
institutions in which they work, both in the education they 
are provided and with the technical resources (hardware, 
software) which are available to them. Technological 
expertise can be a significant problem especially in 
poor countries. In Slovenia, the technical and software 
equipment is adequate. However, lack of funding presents 
a problem.49 
The Trojan horse defence can be used in two roles: to 
exonerate an innocent defendant or suspect, and as a last 
resort of a real perpetrator, against whom all the evidence 
points to his guilt. In such cases, the Trojan horse 
defence becomes a tactic whose purpose is to provide for 
confusion and uncertainty in the minds of the jury and the 
judge. Which version of the defence is used will often be 
difficult to detect. The burden of proof is, of course, on the 
prosecution, and in reality it is on the examination of the 
digital evidence. 
When dealing with a Trojan horse defence the 
following course of action should be undertaken in the 
investigation. Digital evidence specialists should perform 
a systematic examination of the computer system for 
malicious software, using more than one investigation 
tool (new SSD hard drives and software encryption of the 
hard drive could pose a problem). It is preferable than 
more investigators examine the system and  
compare the results. A multidisciplinary approach  
should always be considered. It is important that the 
prosecution connects digital evidence with corroborative 
evidence, such as witnesses, evidence of motive,  
physical evidence such as photographs, undercover 
investigative measures and interrogation of the accused. 
By combining classical evidence with digital evidence, the 
prosecution will reduce the probability of the presence of 
a malicious code.
© Miha Šepec, 2012
49 Interview with Primož Kragelj, a Forensics IT 
specialist in Slovenia on 28 March 2012.
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